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Research Article
Divorce and remarriage in rural Malawi
Georges Reniers 1
Abstract
The demographic study of nuptiality in African countries is not very developed and
often of secondary interest in a discussion of the proximate determinants of fertility.
This paper uses unusual marriage history data to examine divorce and remarriage in
rural Malawi.
Life table probabilities of divorce range from 40 to 65 percent and are among the
highest on the continent. An investigation into the determinants of marital instability
using proportional hazards models confirms the importance of kinship systems and
female empowerment, but the mechanism underlying the high divorce rates in Malawi
is more complicated than that. This is, for example, illustrated in the effect of the
polygyny variables. Marriage, divorce, and remarriage are further considered as
empowering strategies that women deploy throughout their lives.
                                                          
1
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1. Introduction
The fierce debate between alliance theorists (e.g., Levi-Strauss) and descent theorists
(e.g., Radcliffe-Brown) has generated a vast body of anthropological research on
nuptiality and divorce that has not yet found a match in demography (see Parkin and
Nyamwana 1987). In this discussion, the most lasting argument is that divorce rates are
inversely related to the degree of rights the “wife-takers” acquire over women through
marriage payments (Hutchinson 1990). The argument also offers a ready-made
explanation for the vulnerability of marriage in populations with a matrilineal descent
system. In matrilineal populations, the reproductive potential of women belongs to the
lineage of the wife, and that is, among others, reflected in consistently lower marriage
transactions. Both these characteristics are thought to undermine the stability of
marriages. In addition, matrilineal descent systems are often accompanied by uxorilocal
residence after marriage, thereby de facto severing the husband from the resource base
of his power and authority. While western observers are often found guilty of inflating
the importance of kinship systems (Marks and Rathbone 1983), observations regarding
the instability of marriage in matrilineal regions of southern Malawi are remarkably
persistent over time (e.g., Mitchell 1956, Phiri 1983 and Kaler 2001).
The demographic study of marriage and divorce is less detailed and often of
secondary interest in a discussion of the proximate determinants of fertility (Bledsoe
and Pison 1994, Brandon 1990). The absence of adequate data is partly responsible for
that. Vital registration systems are virtually nonexistent and matrimonial histories are
weakly covered in both censuses and surveys. The standard Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS) offer little additional information compared to censuses because they
only record the marital status at the time of the survey. The existence of survey data
with an extensive coverage of matrimonial histories thus offers an opportunity for the
advancement of a demographic analysis of nuptiality dynamics in Africa.
Three views are considered the canvas against which I give meaning to the results
obtained here. In highly stylized form, the first and most persistent idea in the literature
treats the power and autonomy of women as a mechanism that destabilizes the bond
between partners. In the anthropological literature it is the power of the lineage of the
wife that is stressed rather than the position of women themselves, but it is often
assumed that it also affects the balance of power within the household. In a more
economically inspired worldview, increased labor market participation of women is
thought to decrease the returns from marriage because it undermines a system of
productive efficiency that rests on gender-based specialization in the household (Becker
1991). Though the details of the argument are less relevant in the context of the present
study, it encapsulates the same idea that greater (economic) autonomy of women
contributes to marital instability. At this level of abstraction, the destabilizing force of
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female empowerment is also accommodated by Goode’s (1963 and 1993) theory that
treats modernization as the root cause for elevated divorce rates.
On the other hand, Goode also believes that modernization and industrialization
can contribute to marriage stability in high divorce systems. The assumed mechanism is
an increasing pressure on traditional marriage practices (e.g., arranged marriage) that
are conducive to instability. This argument is picked up by Jones (1997), who asserts
that the increasing autonomy of youngsters (and thus of young women) and a greater
freedom in partner selection contributed to the stability of marriages in Southeast Asia.
Among Muslims in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, impressive reductions in
divorce rates occurred between the 1950s and the 1980s, a period characterized by
ongoing industrialization and modernization. A similar argument had already been
defended in the 1930s for Japan (Iwasaki 1931). Although these authors attempt to
explain changes over time and the present study is based on a cross section, the
hypothesis could be maintained that greater empowerment of women contributes to
marital stability.
The third hypothesis introduces a life course perspective. In a discussion of
marriage and divorce in West Africa, Locoh and Thiriat (1995) maintain that marriage
and divorce are two of the strategies that women utilize in their quest for greater control
over their lives. The struggle for autonomy is a multistage process in which women first
liberate themselves from the control of the paternal household through marriage. The
process is completed through divorce, by which they obtain independence from the
husband and his kin. First marriage, from that perspective, is a rite of passage to greater
self-control and part of a process of female empowerment.
Rather than deriving and testing some of the presuppositions implied in the views
just introduced, I let myself lead by some empirical observations on divorce
encountered in the literature to see whether they match the results for Malawi. At a later
stage, I confront them with the ideas presented above. The choice for Malawi is guided
by the availability of adequate survey data. It is of further interest since it falls outside
the range of countries that are better covered by studies of nuptiality (Note 1). Malawi
is also characterized by an intriguing heterogeneity in religious beliefs and kinship
systems.
In the ensuing sections of this paper, I briefly describe the setting and the data,
discuss some of the empirical relationships reported in the literature, give estimates of
the frequency of divorce and remarriage in the MDICP sample, and present results of an
analysis of the determinants of marriage instability. The final part contains an
exploration of differences in the residence pattern of women in first and higher order
marriages. The latter is an attempt to get an insight into the possibly empowering effect
of divorce and remarriage in women’s lives.
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2. The setting and the data
Even by African standards, Malawi is a relatively poor country. It ranks 151st (out of
164) on the Human Development Index and its GDP per capita is $586 US (in
purchasing power parity) compared to an average of $1,640 for Sub-Saharan Africa
(UNDP 2001). In 1998, the life expectancy at birth was estimated at 40 years for males
and 44 years for females. Life expectancy decreased slightly between 1987 and 1998
(DHS 2001). With an estimated adult prevalence rate of 16 percent in 1999, HIV/AIDS
can be held accountable for that decline (UNAIDS/WHO 2000). The population growth
rate in the 1990s is estimated to be around 2 percent. The TFR of 6.2 is still high, but it
declined by more than 1 child between 1987 and 1998 (DHS 2001).
In Figure 1, Malawi stands out because of a marriage pattern that is more
comparable to Burkina Faso than to the other southern and east African countries.
While marriage is virtually universal in all countries shown, Malawi is among the
countries where women marry relatively early. In the age groups 15-19 and 20-24 close
to 40 and 90 percent respectively have ever been married. Between 1992 and 2000, the
median age at marriage for the age group 20-24 increased from 17.7 to 18.2 years (DHS
2001).
% ever married (at time of interview) % divorced (at time of interview)
Figure 1: Proportions divorced and ever married by age in selected African
countries (women only, 1998-2000)
Note:
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys (http://www.measuredhs.com/)
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In addition to a pattern of early and universal marriage, divorce is relatively
common. Although the percentages reported in Figure 1 are confounded by the speed
and frequency of remarriage, Malawi is characterized by a high incidence of divorce.
Four percent of the women in the age group 20-24 were divorced at the time of the
survey, and among the 45-49 year olds this is around 7.5 percent. These figures are
slightly lower than the prevalence of divorce in the sample that is used here. As we will
see later, there are important regional variations.
The data used in the remainder of this paper come from the female questionnaires
of the second round of the longitudinal Malawi Diffusion and Ideational Change Project
(MDICP) conducted in 2001 (Note 2). It is a probability sample of women in three rural
districts. In addition to the classical socioeconomic and demographic background
characteristics, the second wave of the MDICP recorded matrimonial histories (i.e., the
timing and duration of first, last, and one-but-last marriage). Although the survey is
exceptional in its coverage of matrimonial histories, it does not include information on
cohabitation, on the costs of marriage transactions, marriage negotiations, or a more
subtle approach to measuring marriage as a process rather than a discrete event  (see
Van de Walle 1968, Meekers 1992). When reference is made to divorce, it also includes
separation. The combination of both categories is justified by the fact that periods of
separation are often followed by divorce. In addition, separation only accounts for
around 5 percent of the marriages that ended (Note 3).
The sample size for this analysis is 1342 ever-married women (Note 4), more or
less equally divided between the three districts. The Rumphi district in the north is
characterized by a predominantly patrilineal system of descent with patrilocal residence
after marriage and inheritance traced through sons. The ethnic groups in the south
(Balaka) follow a matrilineal system of descent and inheritance, and residence after
marriage is most often matrilocal. In Mchinji, in the center of the country, descent is
less rigidly matrilineal and residence may be either matrilocal or patrilocal.
Marriage negotiations are less extensive and less formalized in the matrilineal
groups in the south than in the north. In these settings, the costs of marriage transactions
tend to be lower as well. Marriage transactions are not very substantial in any of the
three districts, and the role of parents and kin in the decision-making process is fairly
limited. Most often, it is the future husband who initiates marriage negotiations, and the
instances where the parents steer the choice of the spouse or the outcome of the
negotiations are rare. Women are usually consulted and their opinion is important in the
decision-making process. As a result of the ease with which marriage negotiations take
place, they usually do not take very long to complete (Zulu 1996, Schatz 2002).
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Sources of bias
Most of the analyses presented here are based on life-table methods applied to
retrospective data derived from female interviews. These methods are well designed to
handle censoring as a result of the timing of the interview as well as censoring due to
the death of the husband. There is, however, no appropriate way to account for possible
differences in female mortality by marital status because women who died between the
two waves were simply not re-interviewed. This bias may not be as innocent as it
seems. In an era of high HIV prevalence, both marital stability and AIDS mortality can
become functions of extra-marital sexual activity. The most obvious effect of such an
association would be the underestimation of divorce in a cross-sectional sample.
Though there is little more we can do at this stage than acknowledge the problem;
subsequent rounds of data collection in the MDICP will allow for a longitudinal
analysis of divorce and this problem will be overcome.
Another source of bias is caused by differences in the propensity to migrate by
marital status. To the extent that marriages involve partners from different locations,
marriage breakup almost automatically leads to migration. In the most obvious
scenario, the residence of one of the spouses will not change while the other moves
back to the village where he or she came from, or, to another place altogether. Because
the MDICP sample sites are situated in rural areas, post-divorce migration out of the
sample sites leads to an underestimation of divorce. Of all women interviewed in the
first round of the MDICP, about 15 percent could not be retrieved in the second round
because of migration-related causes. In addition, there is a logical reason to believe that
these post-divorce migration patterns are linked to sex and the residence pattern after
marriage. Where residence after marriage is virilocal, women are more likely to move
out whereas husbands are expected to head off if residence is uxorilocal. In southern
local narratives, it is often said that the man is supposed to “leave with his blanket”,
meaning that he is not only expected to leave after divorce, but that he cannot claim any
material goods from the household –except for his blanket– nor the custody over the
children (Zulu 1996). This logic would lead us to expect sex-based differences in
divorce-related migration out of the different sample districts. Even though the
observed differences in the loss of follow-up between the three districts point in that
direction (i.e., slightly higher loss of follow-up in Rumphi and Mchinji than in Balaka),
it is not statistically significant. The attrition is nonetheless responsible for a slight
underestimation of divorce probabilities. It is much less certain whether or not these
biases affect parameter estimates in a multivariate analysis (Alderman et al. 2001,
Bignami et al. in this volume).
Other confounding factors are related to the retrospective nature of the survey.
This may involve a bias in the definition of what a marriage constitutes if asked to
evaluate retrospectively, and, partly related to that, the omission of early and
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unsuccessful marriages by older women (Brandon 1990). In addition, there are the
sources of bias common to most surveys in developing countries such as the
misreporting of ages and timing of events. To minimize the number of individuals with
missing ages, the interviewers were instructed to probe. No such procedure was
followed for ‘age at marriage’, and the number of missing values on that variable is
considerable.
3. Variables and expected outcomes
To organize the discussion of possible determinants of divorce, I build on the argument
of Murphy (1985) that less volitional factors (e.g., social class and religion) are not as
powerful predictors of marital breakdown as behavioral aspects within the couple’s
realm of control. Among the latter, he cites age at marriage, childbearing patterns, the
type of wedding ceremony, etc. What Murphy calls “less volitional characteristics”, I
will label individual characteristics. The variables that Murphy identifies as “volitional”
characterize couples rather than individuals. Here, they will be labeled couple or
marriage characteristics and deal with the residence pattern of the household after
marriage, the usual place of residence of the husband, ethnic homogamy and polygyny.
At least conceptually, appropriate models should account for the context wherein
individuals grow up and wherein marital decisions are taken. In the present discussion,
these could refer to the kinship and descent system, customs with regard to the division
of property, legal constraints, agricultural systems, and possibly others. Most of these
data are not available, but I will use district to account for the heterogeneity in the
context wherein marriage decisions are taken.
In the next section, an overview of individual and couple characteristics will be
presented with a discussion of their effects as reported in the literature. Table 1 at the
end of the section summarizes the distribution of these characteristics in the three
sample districts.
3.1. Individual characteristics
Birth cohort
To examine a possible evolution over time, the most logical choice would be to control
for differences in the risk of divorce by marriage cohort. In the analyses presented here,
preference was given to year of birth. This choice was driven by a concern to reduce the
number of missing observations. Because the variance in age at first marriage (both
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over time and between districts) is fairly limited, we can use birth cohort as a substitute
for marriage cohort.
Education
Education is often used as a proxy for female empowerment. Results for the effect of
education on marital stability in Africa are, however, not always easy to interpret. In
some cases the relationship between female education and divorce is found to be
positive (Isiugo-Abanihe 1998). Under other circumstances its influence appears to be
non-linear, with the lowest divorce rates observed among uneducated women and
among the highest educational groups (Brandon 1990; Tilson and Larsen 2000, Takyi
2001).
In this study, a distinction will be made between women who had at least three
years of education and those with less or no education at all. Three years of education is
the median value for the sample distribution. The effects of more precise
categorizations for educational attainment were tested but the results were similar.
Religion
With regard to Africa, scholars often associate Christianity with an ideational change
increasing women’s autonomy. Most often this is suggested in connection with elevated
levels of education through the establishment of missionary schools (Lesthaeghe et al.
1989). It remains nonetheless questionable to what extent the conversion to Christianity
(or Islam) had an emancipating effect on women’s position and to what extent these
imported religions introduced values that accentuate the subordinate position of women
in the household or society. Though there may be other examples, the promotion of the
patriarchal (and sometimes also nuclear) family was one of the important vocations of
the early Christian (and Islamic) missionaries. In matrilineal populations this obviously
happened to the detriment of women’s position (Peters 1997, Phiri 1983).
A review of the empirical results on the association between religious practice and
marital instability reveals some inconsistencies. Most often, Muslim unions are found to
be more stable (Isiugo-Abanihe 1998, Tilson and Larsen 2000), but Brandon (1990)
identifies the opposite pattern in Nigeria. In a discussion of declining divorces rates
among Muslims in Southeast Asia, Jones (1997) maintains that declining divorce rates
were accompanied, and possibly also caused, by trends in more rigorous religious
practices.
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It is thus difficult to make generalizations of the impact of various religions in
different contexts, and in places where significant effects are found it is not always
clear whether they are positively associated to either women’s empowerment, a greater
moral or normative restraint, or even the suppression of women’s rights. In the analyses
that follow, a distinction is made between Christians, Muslims, and a residual category
that contains both traditional African religions and Africanized Christian churches. The
latter separated from the mainstream churches and have a more relaxed attitude to local
practices such as polygyny.
3.2. Couple characteristics
Residence after marriage and the co-residence of spouses
Post-marital residence patterns may be important covariates of marriage stability. On
the one hand, there is the issue of living patrilocally or matrilocally. The distinction
made in the MDICP surveys is virilocal versus uxorilocal and neolocal residence.
Another aspect of residence is whether or not the husband usually co-resides with his
wife.
In populations with matrilineal descent systems, matrilocal residence after
marriage is often the prescription (Note 5). These unions are thought to be inherently
unstable because the husband is separated from the base of his authority in his own
village. In the village of his wife, he is subordinate to her kin group. In practice, men
are sometimes capable of bending these prescriptions to their advantage. In the past,
marrying a slave was one of the options. Nowadays he could resort to cross-cousin
marriage, a marriage within the same village or neighborhood, or simply renegotiate the
residence pattern after a couple of years of marriage (Phiri 1983). In the analyses that
follow, a distinction is made between couples that initially lived virilocally after
marrying and those that did not. The majority of the latter lived uxorilocally. No
information is available on whether the couple moved during their marriage.
Co-residence (Note 6) measures a related though different aspect of marriage
dynamics that could be related to marriage stability (Locoh and Thiriat 1995). The
absence of co-residence of the spouses can have different causes. If the household is
established in the wife’s village, the husband may decide to spend some time in his own
village. In case the husband is polygynous and the different spouses do not live
together, he will divide his time between the different households (Note 7). Internal and
international labor migration may also contribute to the absence of co-residence, but the
MDICP data do not contain information on the migration experience of previous
husbands.
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Ethnic endogamy
In rural areas, ethnic endogamy is reported to have a positive effect on marriage
stability (Locoh and Thiriat 1995). The presumed logic is that ethnic endogamous
marriages are more securely embedded in existing social relations and normative
prescriptions, and therefore less likely to dissolve.
Age at (1st) marriage and the age difference between spouses
Although age at marriage is complicated by the same measurement issues as marriage
period, it is introduced in the later stages of the analysis as an additional control
variable. Higher ages at marriage are typically thought of as an indicator of female
autonomy or female empowerment. In a review of the evidence from Islamic Southeast
Asia, Jones (1997) explicitly links increasing ages at marriage to a greater degree of
self-arrangement of marriages, and that is considered a powerful mechanism of
declining divorce rates.
Age at marriage is often found to have a considerable positive effect on marriage
stability, both in a Western context (Murphy 1985, Martin and Bumpass 1989) and in
African populations (Locoh and Thiriat 1995). Isiugo-Abanihe (1988) did not find a
significant effect. I will test for a non-linear effect of age at marriage, because it can be
assumed that the positive effect of age at marriage on marriage stability decreases with
an increasing age at marriage.
Just as a young age at marriage, a greater age difference between spouses is
sometimes considered characteristic of a subordinate position of women within the
household. A distinction will be made between couples where the husband is at least
seven years older and the others.
Polygyny
In a study in Nigeria, the highest divorce rates were found in monogamous marriages
and in polygynous unions with three wives or more. Unions where two women share
one husband are reported to be most stable  (Brandon 1990, Gage-Brandon 1992).
Instead of classifying unions in terms of the number of co-wives or the rank order of the
wife, two dummy variables are used. The first identifies women who marry into
households where at least one other wife is present at the time of marriage. The other
variable indicates whether or not the husband married an additional wife during their
marriage.
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Childlessness
Because of the value attached to children, barrenness is often considered an important
cause of marriage instability in many African populations (e.g., Van de Walle 1968,
Fortes 1978, Larsen 1989, Isiugo-Abanihe 1988, Takyi 2001). Even though there is no
doubt that childlessness may exert considerable pressure on unions, the importance of
sterility or subfecundity as an explanatory factor for high levels of divorce or
differentials in divorce rates is much more uncertain. Usually it is accepted that around
3 percent of couples are sterile from the beginning of the reproductive period and
remain childless (Bongaarts and Potter 1983). Though regional variations in sterility or
subfecundity may be substantial because of differences in the prevalence of venereal
diseases and female circumcision (Larsen 1989), the MDICP data do not suggest such a
pattern in the study areas under consideration: of all women aged 35-44, only 1.3
percent never had a child and the differences between the three districts were minimal.
It must be remarked that these figures are rather low. In any case, primary female
sterility does not seem to be an important issue for the present analysis. Subfecundity
may be of greater relevance, but that, in part, is also a factor of other variables that will
be included in the analysis: polygyny and co-residence of the spouses (Note 8).
More problematic is the virtual impossibility of separating the effect of sterility or
subfecundity from other associations between childlessness and marital instability. One
of the factors that attenuate the risk of divorce once a union is blessed with children is
that, in case of a divorce, women may lose custody over their children. This involves
not only the rupture of emotional ties but possibly also a source of support at older age.
In these circumstances (which may characterize populations with patrilineal descent
systems to a greater extent), the stabilizing mechanism is not fecundity but the added
benefit of children to the wife if the marriage remains intact. Methodologically, the
entanglement of both effects is not such an issue because they operate in the same
direction and can properly be dealt with in proportional hazards models. Of greater
concern is the possible reversal of the causal order if marital instability contributes to
deferring, or even prevents, childbearing (Murphy 1985). Under these circumstances,
we should be cautious in interpreting the parameter estimates of models that incorporate
childlessness as an independent variable.
Using the MDICP data, it is possible to distinguish fertile from childless unions. A
handicap, however, is that it is impossible to estimate the birth interval between
marriage and first birth. We thus cannot incorporate it as a time-dependent covariate.
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3.3. Omitted variables and effects
A flaw in the analyses presented here is the absence of a good economic indicator of the
wealth of the household and sources of income of both partners during their marriage.
As mentioned before, the information on marital histories is collected through
retrospective questions. No retrospective information was obtained for economic
indicators that could be useful in the present analyses. As more rounds of the MDICP
will be completed, these measures will become available for inclusion in a longitudinal
analysis of divorce (Note 9).
Ethnicity was omitted because it is a quasi-linear combination of other variables
discussed so far (e.g., district, religion, residence after marriage).
In research on marital instability in the United States, pre-marital conceptions are
often found to contribute to marital instability (Morgan and Rindfuss 1985, Billy and
Landsdale 1986). An analogous hypothesis would be more problematic in an African
context because pre-marital conceptions could as well increase a woman’s desirability
since they serve as a proof of her fecundability. In other circumstances a conception
may become an important criterion to formalize the union. It is therefore not surprising
that empirical results are not always clearly interpretable (e.g., Brandon 1990). The
MDICP survey does not offer a good measure of pre-marital conceptions. The effect of
an indicator that measures whether the first sexual partner was the one the respondent
eventually married was tested, but it did not have a significant effect.
Although extra marital affairs, just as other behavioral characteristics such as
alcohol abuse may be the direct causes for divorce (Note 10), they have been omitted
from the present analysis because the information is either not available, or, because the
reliability of this information is questionable.
4. Results
4.1. The distribution of individual and couple characteristics by district and
marriage order
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of most variables discussed so far by district and
marriage order (Note 11). Divorce is most common in Balaka (first two rows). Since
these figures reflect current marital status, they are influenced by the frequency and
speed of remarriage. Note that the figures for Balaka are much higher than those
reported for the country as a whole (see Figure 1). The level of divorce in Rumphi and
Mchinji is close to the national average.
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Rumphi is clearly the district with the highest educational levels. Although the
north is often considered less developed, the establishment of an educational system
with more extensive coverage is presumably the legacy of Protestant missionary
settlement in colonial times. Catholic missionaries in the center of the country have put
less of an effort into the development of an educational system (Zulu 1996). For
political and ideological reasons, far fewer missionary schools were established in
predominantly Muslim areas (Bone 2000). The imbalance in the educational
infrastructure is still not rectified; the low levels of educational attainment in the south
(Balaka) testify to that. The somewhat higher mean age at marriage in Rumphi is
related to these higher levels of schooling. In a simple linear regression model, women
with at least three years of education are on average nine months older when they marry
than those with less or no schooling.
Table 1 also suggests an association between polygyny and kinship system. In the
north (Rumphi) where residence after marriage is often virilocal, polygynous unions are
more common, and the reverse is true for Balaka (Note 12). Even though this
relationship is statistically significant, it is less deterministic than one might expect:
where residence after marriage is virilocal, 33 percent of the women are married into a
polygynous household; where residence is uxorilocal, 27 percent of the first marriages
of women are with a polygynous husband (Phi = .1, p<.02).
The co-residence of spouses does not vary much by district, but it is striking that
20 percent of the married women report that their husband is usually absent. In Rumphi,
the age difference between the spouses is significantly higher than in the other two
districts. This is in part accounted for by a higher frequency of polygynous unions in
the north. Mchinji stands out as the district with the highest frequency of ethnic
heterogeneous marriages.
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Table 1: Individual and couple characteristics by district and marriage order
Balaka
N=443
Mchinji
N=466
Rumphi
N=433
% currently divorced by age group
10.6 5.0 3.4
20-24
45-49 22.2 9.4 11.3
% with three years of schooling or more 23.5 53.0 93.3
Religion
% Christian* 24.7 52.4 51.9
% Muslim 70.1 0.1 0.0
Mean age at 1st marriage (women, ever married) ** 17.5 17.5 18.3
Coresidence of the spouses (in %)
1st marriage 81.3 83.1 77.6
2nd marriage 81.9 82.1 80.2
Residence after marriage (% living virilocally)
1st marriage 23.6 72.6 83.1
2nd marriage 18.0 47.6 74.6
Polygynous husband (in %)
1st marriage 22.6 28.1 40.7
2nd marriage 38.7 47.9 65.6
Age difference between spouses > 6 years (in %)
1st marriage 33.7 31.9 51.1
2nd marriage 37.7 29.6 45.9
Ethnic homogeneous marriage (in %)
1st marriage 74.6 68.3 83.8
2nd marriage 68.2 54.4 70.5
Notes:
* Excluding Africanized Christian churches. They account for most of the residual category.
** Because of the relatively high number of missing values (8.5%), these figures should only be considered as indicative. Missing
values are concentrated among women of older ages.
The percentage of co-residing spouses and the age difference between the partners
remain virtually the same in second compared to first marriages. More interesting is that
a greater percentage of women marry a polygynous husband as their second spouse and
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a lower percentage of women live virilocally in their second marriage. If both polygyny
and virilocal residence are disadvantageous to female empowerment, these trends
appear contradictory. One possible explanation is that there exist two groups of women
with diverging marriage trajectories: on the one hand a group of women that improve
their position from one marriage to the next in the sense that they less often live
patrilocally and on the other hand a group of women who have to settle more often for a
polygamous husband. The first of these confirms the suggestion of Locoh and Thiriat
(1995) that women use divorce and remarriage as empowering strategies throughout
their lifecourse, the latter contradicts that same hypothesis. This issue will be taken up
again later in this paper.
4.2. First marriages: life table analysis
Before elaborating on the net effects of the potential determinants of divorce, it is worth
looking at the cumulative divorce probabilities in the three districts (Figure 3). The
overall levels of divorce are not only high, but the discrepancy between the different
areas is striking. In Balaka, close to one-third of first marriages do not survive their fifth
anniversary. After 25 years, almost 65 percent of the first marriages have been
dissolved. The comparable figures for Rumphi are 14 and 40 percent. Though still
uncontrolled for other factors, these differences are highly statistically significant. In
evaluating this figure, we must keep in mind that these data only apply to rural areas. In
addition, we have good reasons to believe that the divorce probabilities in the MDICP
data are underestimates of their real values because of the sample design. As mentioned
before, this bias may be higher for Mchinji and Rumphi than for Balaka, and that may
attenuate the observed regional differences somewhat.
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Figure 2: Life table divorce probabilities for first marriages by marriage duration
and district (N=1322, 20 missing values)
To get a clearer picture of the exceptionally high figures in the MDICP sample, a
comparison with similar data for other countries might be in order. For the three
districts combined, 45 percent of the marriages end in divorce within 20 years. In
Ethiopia, a country where the divorce rate is considered to be high, 40 percent of the
marriages do not last for longer than 20 years (Tilson and Larsen 2000). Similar -
though older- data for three West African countries are considerably lower: 32 percent
in Cote d’Ivoire, 33 percent in Ghana, and 14 percent in Nigeria (Brandon 1990). In
contrast to the Malawian data, these are national level data that also represent urban
areas. All the figures cited here neutralize the possible confounding effect of
widowhood.
One of the objectives of the analysis that follows is to determine whether the
differences between the three districts persist once we have controlled for individual
and couple characteristics.
4.3. First marriages: multivariate analysis
The variables discussed earlier have been used to fit four Cox regression models with
the likelihood of divorce as the outcome variable. In the presence of censoring (due to
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the mortality of the husband and the timing of the interview), life table techniques are
well suited to calculate divorce probabilities by duration of marriage and one or two
classificatory characteristics. Proportional hazard models are more appropriate to
highlight potential differences in the risk of divorce by a wider number of explanatory
variables. The hazard of divorce for an individual at time t is a function of a baseline
hazard function that is left unspecified, and a linear function of a set of fixed covariates
that are exponentiated (Allison 1995). Table 2 summarizes the hazard ratios for the
different models. The hazard ratios ( eβ ) can be interpreted as the ratio of the estimated
hazard for those with value 1 to the reference category. For quantitative covariates, we
subtract 1 from the hazard ratio and multiply by 100 to obtain the estimated percent
change in the hazard rate for each one-unit increase in the covariate (Allison 1995).
In model 1, only contextual (district) and individual variables are considered. As
can be seen from the R2 value, its explanatory power is relatively small. Model 2
acknowledges the effect of couple characteristics and has significantly more potential in
clarifying determinants of divorce. Models 3 and 4 add age at marriage and the
childlessness of the union as two additional explanatory variables. Models with
interactions between marriage duration, district, and the polygyny variables were tested
but turned out not significant.
Controlling only for individual characteristics, the hazard of divorce is almost
twice as high in Balaka as in Rumphi. Additional controls for couple or marriage
characteristics reduces the effect of district but it remains significant. It is particularly
the difference between Balaka and Rumphi that accounts for that, but the difference
between Balaka and Mchinji is also statistically significant (p<.01).
In model 2, an increase of one year in the year of birth increases the likelihood of
divorce by 1.5 percent. Even though this effect is substantial and suggests that divorce
has increased over time (Note 13), the source of this effect may be caused by the
omission of early unsuccessful marriages by older women. A similar distortion has been
reported by Brandon (1990). For that reason, the result obtained here is not a sound
basis for rejecting Kaler’s (2001) suggestion that there has been little, if not no, increase
in the frequency of divorce over time. These results do not offer a confirmation of such
a thesis either.
Education does not seem to have an effect on divorce hazards. In interpreting these
results, we should remember that the variance in educational attainment in the sample
sites is limited and highly correlated with district (see also Table 1). We thus have little
leverage to observe significant results even if they existed.
When compared to African and Africanized religions, Christianity reduces the
likelihood of divorce. The effect of being Muslim tends to operate in the same direction,
but is less consistent.
Demographic Research – Special Collection 1: Article 6
-- Social Interactions and HIV/AIDS in Rural Africa --
192 http://www.demographic-research.org
Table 2:  Hazard ratios for Cox regression models of 1st marriage dissolution°
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
District
    Balaka 2.132*** 1.617*** 1.749*** 1.563**
    Mchinji 1.129 1.097 1.107 1.057
    Rumphi - - - -
Individual characteristics
Year of birth 1.010** 1.015*** 1.019*** 1.017***
Female education
       > 3 years 1.057 1.036 1.116 1.135
       <= 3 years - - - -
Religion
    Christian 0.512*** 0.586*** 0.567*** 0.557***
    Muslim 0.565** 0.760 0.579*** 0.534***
    Other (traditional) - - - -
Marriage and couple characteristics
Residence of the household
   Uxorilocal & neolocal 1.316*** 1.295** 1.290**
   Virilocal - - -
Usual place of stay of the husband
   In the household 0.316*** 0.295*** 0.327***
   Somewhere else - - -
Age difference between spouses
   > 6 years 0.569*** 0.555*** 0.575***
   <= 6 years - - -
Ethnic homogeneous marriage
   Yes 0.802* 0.791* 0.760**
   No - - -
Co-wives present at marriage
   Yes 1.412*** 1.550*** 1.465***
   No - - -
Husband married additional wives
   Yes 0.790** 0.849 0.837
   No - - -
Age at marriage 0.989 0.978
Age at marriage (Sq) 1.003** 1.002
Children in union
   Yes 0.230***
   No -
N (missing values) 1322 (20) 1297 (45) 1206 (136) 1200 (142)
Likelihood Ratio Chi Square 69.25 244.92 236.88 308.46
Df 6 12 14 15
R2 0.05 0.17 0.18 0.23
Notes:
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p <  0.1. Huber-White corrections are applied to the standard errors to account for unobserved
heterogeneity at the village level.
° The R2 reported at the bottom of Table 2 was originally proposed by Cox and Snell and is calculated as:
R e
G
n2 1
2
= −
−




where n stands for the sample size and G2 for the likelihood ratio chi square statistic for testing the null hypothesis that all
effects are 0 (Allison 1995). The Cox models ignore unobserved population heterogeneity. If anything, it will bias parameters
towards 0 (Vaupel and Yashin 1999)
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Because of their proximity to marriage stability, couple characteristics yield more
clearly identifiable effects. In line with the structural anthropological argument,
virilocal residence after marriage is associated with more stable marriages. The co-
residence of the spouses is, however, a much stronger covariate than the location of the
household. The risk of divorce for marriages where partners co-reside is only one-third
of what it is when the husband is usually absent. This is by far the strongest effect of
any of the variables in model 2. This is not surprising since co-residence by itself may
already be an indicator of marriage instability. On the other hand, the absence of the
husband may give rise to suspicion about his whereabouts and fidelity or complaints
about his contributions to the household’s income. If the absence of co-residence is
related to migration, then this also suggests that the frailty of unions is dependent on the
economic circumstances of the household and on migration as a coping strategy thereof.
Most of the interpretations of this effect are necessarily speculative because no precise
information about the reasons for the absence of co-residence is available.
A large age difference between spouses significantly reduces the risk of divorce
and may be an indication of a greater submissiveness of women to the authority of their
husband. Ethnically homogenous marriages are also less likely to end up in divorce.
The greater stability of these marriages is consistent with results from previous research
(Locoh and Thiriat 1995).
The polygyny indicators yield interesting results. When a woman marries into a
household where other wives are present, the risk of divorce increases. If the husband,
on the contrary, marries an additional wife during their marriage, the risk of marriage
dissolution is attenuated. The first observation points to an often-suggested
characteristic of polygynous households with competition between wives and greater
marriage instability. Marrying into a household where other women are present also
implies that the woman’s position is of a lower rank (2nd at best) and that seems to
negatively affect stability. The reasons for the stabilizing effect of the husband
marrying additional wives are twofold. First, it implies that the wife is of a higher rank
than the incoming woman and may therefore enjoy higher status and possibly power
within the household. In addition, marrying an additional wife may be considered an
alternative to divorce. If the husband, for example, suspects his wife to be barren or if
she only bears him daughters, he may force her to accept an additional wife in exchange
for not being divorced.
Age at marriage has only been introduced at a later stage of the analysis because of
the great number of missing values for that variable. In model 3, the effect of age at
marriage (non-linear) indicates that the risk of divorce decreases as the age at marriage
increases but at a decreasing rate.
The effect of childlessness is very strong and highly significant. Because of the
reservations raised earlier, it is not clear whether it is worthwhile to attach a lot of
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importance to that effect. Interesting, nevertheless, is that even in the presence of this
control, the effects of the other variables remain within the same order of magnitude.
Only the squared age term loses statistical significance.
4.4. Remarriage and the instability of higher-order marriages
Remarriage is almost universal. Over 40 percent of the women remarry within 2 years
after a divorce; that figure increases steadily to reach 75 percent after 5 years and close
to 90 percent after 10 years. Remarriage is significantly slower among widowed women
and reaches a maximum of just over 70 percent. These differences are statistically
significant and partly accounted for by the fact that widowed women are, on average,
somewhat older and therefore less likely to remarry (not shown).
Remarriage probabilities also vary by district. This is visible in Figure 3. In
Balaka, where divorce is more common, remarriage occurs faster. Especially when
contrasted with Rumphi, it is also more universal: over 90 percent as compared to 78
percent.
Figure 3: Remarriage by duration since marriage breakup (N=567, 43 missing
values)
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Figure 4: Cumulative divorce probabilities for 1st and higher-order marriages by
district (N=601, 9 missing values)
Via a proportional hazards model, it was tested whether the differences between
the regions persist after controlling for the outcome of the first marriage (divorced
versus widowed), but they remained virtually unchanged (not shown).
In Figure 4, the cumulative divorce probabilities for first and second marriages are
compared. In all three districts, the probability of divorce in higher-order marriages is
lower than for first marriages. The difference is a little more accentuated for Rumphi
than for the other two districts. This finding contradicts observations for the United
States where the divorce rate is higher for second than for first marriages (Martin and
Bumpass 1989).
A proportional hazards model with the outcome of second marriages was tested
with the same independent variables as in Model 2 for first marriages. A general
tendency in the results was a reduction in the effects of most variables. With the
exception of the co-residence of the spouses, none of the independent variables had a
statistically significant effect. Just as for first marriages, co-residence reduces the risks
of divorce considerably.
Noteworthy perhaps is the reversal of the effect for women who marry into a
household where another wife is already present. For first marriages this tended to
increase the hazard of divorce significantly; in second or higher-order marriages it
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seems to have a stabilizing effect. Because the relatively high standard error of that
estimate, we cannot be sure whether the reversal is reflecting a true pattern. In addition
to the variables mentioned previously, the effect of the outcome of the first marriage
(ended in divorce or through widowhood) was tested. While higher- order marriages of
previously divorced women seem to be less stable, its effect was again not statistically
significant. Our inability to identify significant effects may indicate that this analysis
lacks statistical power (Note 14).
4.5. Divorce and remarriage as empowering strategies
So far the analyses have highlighted some of the correlates of divorce, but they have
hardly clarified the place of marriage and divorce in the life course of women. A focus
on the latter is essential for understanding the possible role of marriage and divorce as
an empowering strategy in women’s lives in the sense that it was advanced by Locoh
and Thiriat (1995). Here, I consider the residence of the household after marriage as an
empowering factor. It is assumed that patrilocal (or virilocal) residence is
disadvantageous to women because it implies that they come under the direct control of
their husband and his kin. If residence after marriage is matri- or uxorilocal, women’s
position is more securely embedded in the social relationships with her own kin and
therefore likely to be to her advantage. Such an interpretation is subject to the critique
of reading too much significance into the residence of the household and therefore it
should only be considered as an initial attempt at gaining an understanding of divorce
and remarriage as strategic choices that women deploy throughout their lives. In a very
analogous manner, the discussion that follows assumes that women, on average, prefer
a monogamous over a polygynous husband.
The analysis consists of two steps. First, a simple comparison of first and second
marriages is made in terms of marriage type (polygynous/monogamous) and residence
pattern (table 3). This is comparable to the figures presented in table 1, but to avoid
possible selection effects, the sample is now restricted to women who married at least
twice. Table 3 confirms the bifurcation of marriage outcomes for women. On the one
hand, women more often marry a polygynous husband in higher order marriages (from
29 to 48%). At the same time, they more often succeed to avoid living virilocally in
higher order marriages (from 52 to 59%). The latter is possibly related to the fact
spouses in a polygynous household do not always co-reside. The row percentages in
table 3 indicate that this can only be part of the explanation because the proportion of
women living uxorilocally increases for all women, whether their husband is
polygynous or not.
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Table 3: Women’s residence after marriage, by marriage type
(polygynous/monogamous) and marriage order (observed row % and
marginal distributions)*
1st marriage 2nd marriage
Uxorilocal
(or neolocal) Virilocal Total
Uxorilocal
(or neolocal) Virilocal Total
Monogamous 55 45 71 67 33 52
Polygynous 43 57 29 51 49 48
Total 52 48 100 59 41 100
Note.
* The sample is restricted to women who married at least twice. N=533 (12 missing values)
Table 4: Odds ratios for a GEE logistic regression with uxorilocal (and neolocal)
versus virilocal residence as the outcome, and marriage order, district
and marriage type as the explanatory variables*
District
Balaka Mchinji Rumphi
2nd marriage vs 1st marriage 1.7 1.7 1.7
Marriage type
Monogamous – coresiding 7.7 1.7 0.5
Monogamous – not coresiding 6.1 0.9 1.2
Polygynous – coresiding 6.1 1.0 0.2
Polygynous – not coresiding 6.0 1.8 1.0
Note:
* The analysis is restricted to women who married at least twice. N=533 (21 missing values). GEE (generalized estimating equations)
was chosen to adjust the standard errors for the dependence among observations (Allison 1999). LR Chi-square: 284.9, df: 12,
p<.01. The effects of marriage order and the interaction between marriage type and district are significant at the 5%-level.
The relationship between residence after marriage and marriage type is further explored
in a second step that includes additional controls for the co-residence of the spouses and
district. This is done via a logistic regression model that predicts uxorilocal residence
after marriage (table 4). The analysis essentially confirms that uxurilocal residence after
marriage is more common in higher order than in first marriages. The interaction
between marriage type and district further illustrates that uxorilocal residence is more
common in Balaka and that the co-residence of the spouses is a good predictor of
virilocal residence in Rumphi, and particularly so if the husband is polygamous. The
interaction between marriage order and marriage type is not significant, meaning that
the effect of marriage order on residence after marriage is similar across marriage types.
So in terms of the Locoh-Thiriat hypothesis that divorce is used by women as a
strategy to improve their position throughout their life course, we only get a partial
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confirmation. On the one hand, women's ‘value’ on the marriage market seems to
decrease and a greater proportion is remarrying a polygamous husband. On the other
hand, those women who manage to remarry monogamously seem to escape to a greater
extent the control of their in-laws. Herein we find some evidence for the Locoh-Thiriat
hypothesis.
5. Conclusion
Marriage in Malawi is a fragile institution. Especially in Balaka, the divorce
probabilities must be among the highest recorded on the continent. The anthropological
argument that divorce is more common in populations with matrilineal descent systems
only partly accounts for the observed differences between the three districts. Elevated to
a higher level of abstraction, this observation nonetheless offers support for the idea that
marriage instability is positively correlated with female empowerment. The effect of the
age difference between spouses operates in the same direction. Less strong evidence
could be found for the hypothesis that female empowerment stabilizes the marital bond.
The few indications pointing in that direction are that women who marry older are less
likely to divorce, and the observation that monogamous marriages are more stable. The
effect of the polygyny variables, however, highlights more intricate relationships that
reflect both the position of the woman vis-à-vis her co-wives and the relationship with
her husband. Although not directly measured, we also find indications that point to the
role of labor migration in marriage instability.
The role of marriage, divorce, and remarriage in the life course of women is also
fascinating and deserves greater attention than could be given here. For now, it appears
that women more often marry a polygynous husband in higher-order compared to first
marriages. To the extent that this is undesirable, it indicates that divorced women lose
value on the marriage market. At the same time, women more often live uxorilocally in
higher-order marriages. This is true for both women who remarry a monogamous or a
polygamous husband, but in the latter case (particularly in Rumphi) it often means that
the spouses do not co-reside. Together, these observations suggest the existence of
diverging patterns between a group of women who gain through divorce and remarriage
and a group of women who seem having to settle for less in higher-order marriages.
If thinking in terms of power and empowerment, the perspective that considers
marriage and divorce as active strategies deployed throughout the life course as part of
a negotiating process for power is an important addition to the static view that
appreciates power solely as an outcome or determinant of marital stability. In an
analogous manner, marriage and divorce can become tools at the disposal of individuals
for managing risk or insecurity. Risk to the exposure of HIV/AIDS is one such issue.
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Divorce may offer protection against HIV if the spouse is suspected of having extra-
marital affairs; (re)marriage potentially has the same effect because it is likely to reduce
the frequency of casual relationships. The expansion of the HIV/AIDS pandemic could
thus become a contributing factor for seemingly growing divorce rates in Malawi and/or
the persistence of the differences between the three districts studied here. Such
conclusions, however, require great interpretative leaps and necessarily remain
speculative.
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Notes
1.  A curious bias in the study of marriage in Africa is the more extensive coverage of
the ex-colonies of francophone countries (Van de Walle 1968). This predominance
of west and central Africa in the demographic analysis of nuptiality seems to have
persisted over time (see Bledsoe and Pison 1994).
2.  See the introduction to this volume for a detailed description of the MDICP.
3.  The formulation of the question in the survey was how the marriage “ended”.
“Separation” was listed as a pre-coded answer category in addition to “divorce”
and “became a widow”.
4.  The total sample size for the second round of the MDICP was 1587 women, but
245 new spouses of the men interviewed in 1998 were excluded because they are
believed to be atypical: a disproportionate share of these women is, for example,
married to a polygynous husband.
5.  Note that matriliny is a complex of several variables that goes beyond residence
after marriage. It also includes the exercise of domestic authority and the control or
custody over children (Phiri 1983). Residence after marriage is relatively easily
measured and that is the aspect that is recorded in the MDICP surveys.
6.  In the MDICP survey it was asked whether the husband “usually stayed in the same
village” rather than in the same household.
7.  For first marriages, only marginal statistical associations exist between co-
residence and residence after marriage (p=.08), and between co-residence and
polygyny (p=.04).
8.  Another aspect that may be of importance but not dealt with here is whether the
divorce probabilities are affected by the sex of the children born during marriage.
In populations with a strong preference for sons, women who only bear daughters
may be subject to repudiation.
9.  Because it can be assumed that land ownership is less variable over time than other
sources of income, I tested whether current land ownership by women has an effect
on the stability of first marriages. No significant effect was found.
10.  In the qualitative projects that accompany the MDICP, extra-marital affairs as well
as alcohol abuse were cited as reasons why women divorced and as conditions
under which divorce is acceptable or even recommended (Schatz 2002).
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11.  Due to the design of the questionnaire, information on 2nd marriages was available
only for those who married two or three times. For them (N=511), the analyses that
follow pertain to 2nd marriages. For women married four times or more (N=22) the
analyses that follow pertain to the one but last marriage.
12.  Recent estimates of polygyny at the national level are lower than in the MDICP
sample. In the 2000 DHS-survey, around 17 percent of the married women and
around 9 percent of the men are in polygynous unions  (DHS 2001). The
discrepancy with the figures presented here is probably due to the selection of the
sample sites.
13.  A value of 1.015 implies that the divorce hazard is around 16 percent higher for a
woman who is 30 compared to one who is 40 years old. In this case, the effect is
controlled for other variables in the model. Only controlling for district, the effect
is slightly smaller (1.009) but still significant at the 5 percent level.
14.  The sample size for the analysis of second marriages is 629, but 74 percent of these
observations are censored.
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